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THE WILD, WILD WESTERN HEMISPHERE: DUE PROCESS AND
TREATY LIMITATIONS ON THE POWER OF UNITED
STATES COURTS TO TRY FOREIGN
NATIONALS ABDUCTED ABROAD BY
GOVERNMENT AGENTS
The United States government is committed to fighting a "War on
Drugs,"' a war that includes prosecuting foreigners for acts committed
abroad which violate United States drug laws. 2 Extradition is the tradi-
1. On September 6, 1989, President George Bush delivered a televised speech in which he
proposed a national drug control strategy that emphasizes prosecution of drug sellers and users. See
Weinraub, President Offers Strategy for US on Drug Control, N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1989, at Al, col.
6. See also Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging "Drug Exception" to the Bill of Rights, 38 HAs-
TINoS L. 889 (1987) (detailing Reagan Administration efforts to stem the flow of drugs into the
United States).
2. Recently, the United States has increased efforts to prosecute foreign nationals for conduct
committed outside the territorial United States. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. CL
1056, 1068-69 (Brennan, J., dissenting), reh Ig denied, 110 S. Ct. 1839 (1990). Such prosecutions are
authorized by federal controlled substances statutes. See, e.g., 46 U.S.C. App. § 1903(h) (1982 &
Supp. 1986) (section proscribing the manufacture, distribution, or possession with intent to manufac-
ture or distribute controlled substances on board vessels "is intended to reach acts... committed
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States"); 21 U.S.C. § 959(c) (same provision in sec-
tion concerning possession, manufacture, or distribution of a controlled substance for the purpose of
unlawful importation). See also Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1311-12 (9th Cir.
1984) (same principle applies to prosecution for conspiracy to violate federal narcotics law), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1031 (1985).
Foreigners are also subject to United States antitrust and securities laws such as those governing
transactions involving stock registered and listed on a national securities exchange if the alleged
conduct is "detrimental to the interests of American investors." Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at
1069 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 208 (2d Cir.
1968), rev'd on rehearing on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert. denied sub
nom., Manley v. Schoenbaum, 395 U.S. 906 (1969)). In addition, the United States imposes on
foreigners a host of federal criminal statutes aimed at international terrorism. Verdugo-Urquidez,
110 S. Ct. at 1069. See, eg., 18 U.S.C. § 32(b) (prohibiting violence aboard civil aircraft registered in
another country); 18 U.S.C. § 115 (prohibiting threats against a federal official's family members); 18
U.S.C. § 1203 (prohibiting abductions if any party involved is a United States national or the defend-
ant is found within the United States or the kidnapper attempts to compel United States government
action); 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (prohibiting terrorist acts committed abroad against United States nation-
als); 49 U.S.C. § 1472(n) (prohibiting aircraft piracy outside United States air space, if the offender is
found in the United States).
Under international law, a state has subject matter jurisdiction to enforce a rule of law if it has
jurisdiction to prescribe the conduct in question. United States v. Keller, 451 F. Supp. 631, 634 (D.
P.R. 1978).
The law of nations permits the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by a nation under five
general principles: territorial, wherein jurisdiction is based on the place where the offense is
committed; national, wherein jurisdiction is based on the nationality or national character
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tional means of achieving the international rendition of criminal defend-
ants? However, extraditing an individual from a foreign country to
stand trial in an American court creates difficult legal4 and practical5
problems.
On October 14, 1989, the New York Times disclosed a secret Justice
Department report advising the Federal Bureau of Investigation that it
legally may seize fugitives in foreign countries without resort to extradi-
tion treaties and without the consent of foreign governments.6 The dis-
of the offender, protective, wherein jurisdiction is based on whether the national interest is
injured; universal, which amounts to physical custody of the offender; and passive personal
wherein jurisdiction is based on the nationality or national character of the victim.
Id. at 635. United States courts have developed an additional category, known as the "objective
territorial principle," in which the courts exercise jurisdiction over individuals who commit acts
outside the United States if the acts are intended to or do produce detrimental effects within the
United States. Id. See also Note, Federally Sponsored International Kidnapping. An Acceptable
Alternative to Extradition?, 64 WAsH. U.L.Q. 1205, 1209-10 (1986) (these principles support a find-
ing of subject-matter jurisdiction in almost every case).
3. "Extradition is a formal method ofinternational rendition, typically based upon a treaty by
which persons charged with, or convicted of crimes against the laws of a State and found in a foreign
State are returned by the latter to the former for trial or punishment." Stephan, Constitutional
Limits on International Rendition of Criminal Suspects, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 777, n.1 (1980) (citations
omitted).
A fugitive may also be delivered from one state to another through the discretion of the former
under the principle of comity. Id.
4. Even though the United States has entered into extradition treaties with most nations, see
infra note 56, problems still arise. Such treaties may specify the crimes for which extradition is
allowed, require that the act for which extradition is sought be a criminal violation in both countries,
or deny any obligation to surrender a state's own nationals or to extradite persons accused of "polit-
ical offenses." D. OTr, PUBLIC INTERNAIONAL LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD 144 (1987). More-
over, under the doctrine of "specialty," United States courts must try the defendant only for those
crimes for which the person was extradited. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 424 (1886).
5. Consider the situation in Colombia. In 1989, Colombian drug traffickers began a series of
bloody attacks intended to force the government to cease extraditing drug traffickers to the United
States. Colombian Cartels Tied to Bombing, N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1989, at A10, col.1. On August 18,
1989, just two days after President Virgilio Barco Vargas declared war on the drug lords, presiden-
tial candidate Luis Carlos Galan Sarmiento was assassinated. Fricker, A Judiciary Under Fire,
A.B.A. 3., Feb. 1990, at 54. Since then, there have been over 200 bombings in Bogota alone, result.
ing in 29 deaths and 238 other injuries. On November 27, 1989, more than 100 people died when a
jet was bombed. Id. Only nine days later, a truckload of dynamite was detonated in front of secret
police headquarters, killing 52 and wounding 1,000 more. Id. Seventeen judges have been assassi-
nated. Others, including Justice Minister Monica de Greiff, have resigned following threats to their
families. Id.
6. Wines, U.S. Cites Right to Seize Fugitives Abroad, N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1989, § 1, at 6, col.
4. Since issuance of the Justice Department report, at least two defendants have been brought to
trial in the United States by means of a covert forcible abduction from their homelands. See United
States v. Caro-Quintero, No. CR 87-422-ER (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed Library
Dist File) (Mexican doctor kidnapped by agents of U.S. government from office in Guadalajara and
delivered to DEA agents for trial in California); Malta-Ballesteros ex rel. Stolar v. Henman, 697 F.
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closure is encouraging to those who advocate a more aggressive role for
the United States in combating international drug trafficking.7 It causes
concern, however, among some who question whether, in attempting to
stem the flow of illegal drugs into the United States,8 the government
should ignore constraints imposed by international law.9
Supp. 1040, 1041-42 (S.D. IM. 1988) (Honduran resident abducted with the aid of Honduran mili-
tary), aff'd, 896 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1990). The Caro-Quintero and Matta-Ballesteros decisions are
discussed infra at notes 60, 69, 85, 103 and 34 respectively.
On December 20, 1989, American troops invaded Panama for the purpose of toppling the govern-
ment of General Manuel Antonio Noriega. Gordon, U.S. Troops Move in Panama in Effort to Seize
Noriega; Gunfire is Heard in Capital, Alternative Government Sworn-Recognized by Washington,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1989, at Al, col.6. In January 1990, Noriega turned himself over to United
States military forces, who in turn delivered him to DEA agents to face trial in Miami on narcotics
smuggling charges. Fricker, Dealing With the Maximum Leader, A.B.A. J., April 1990, at 54. In its
pretrial motions, the United States government argued that President Bush's action of swearing in
Guillermo Endara's government moments before launching the Panamanian invasion deprives
Noriega of head of state immunity. Id. at 56. If the federal court in Miami agrees, the issue of the
court's power to try Noriega as just another accused drug trafficker, despite his forcible abduction
from Panama, will be directly before the court. See infra note 110.
7. See 135 CONG. REc. S12,673 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1989) (statement of Sen. Specter) (the arrest
of Panama's General Manuel Antonio Noriega by American officials during the unsuccessful coup
attempt would have been entirely proper under international law); 132 CONG. REc. 18,832 (1986)
(statement of Rep. Stump) (no constitutional rights are violated when a terrorist is seized and
brought to the United States for trial); Kester, Some Myths of United States Extradition Law, 76
GEO. L.J. 1441, 1453-54 (1988) (former Attorney General Edwin Meese believed the President could
authorize the kidnapping of foreigners abroad to stand trial in the United States).
8. See Lewis, US. Officials Clash at Hearing on Power to Seize Fugitives, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9,
1989, at A10, col. 3 (noting objections of House Democrat Don Edwards of California, who stated
that "[k]idnapping a suspect would make the U.S. into an international outlaw"). The concern, of
course, is that if the United States government starts kidnapping foreign nationals to face trial for
alleged violations of American law, the governments of other nations will kidnap American citizens
from within the territorial United States to face trial abroad for alleged violations of their laws.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1071 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). See also Bassiouni, Unlawful Seizures
and Irregular Rendition Devices as Alternatives to Extradition, 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 25, 36
(1973).
Such concerns cannot be taken lightly. On November 1, 1989, the Iranian Parliament approved a
law giving that country the power to arrest Americans anywhere and put them on trial in Iran. The
law reportedly was passed in response to the Justice Department's authorization of the FBI to arrest
suspected terrorists abroad. See supra note 6. One Iranian newspaper suggested that the first target
should be the former commander of the United States missile cruiser Vincennes, which mistakenly
shot down an Iranian airliner in 1988. Iran OKs Law Allowing American Arrests Abroad, Los Ange-
les Times, Nov. 1, 1989, at P1, col. 4.
9. Under international law, a state which abducts a person from another state's territory vio-
lates the second state's sovereignty. The violation usually may be redressed by returning the
abductee. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 278 (2d Cir. 1974) (citations omitted). See also
I. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 72 (1971) ("Abduction is clearly an illegal act
by the municipal law of the place where it occurs and by international law.").
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This Note examines the power of a United States court to try an al-
leged criminal forcibly abducted1" from foreign soil by United States gov-
ernment agents without the consent of the defendant's home
government.1  Part I discusses the historical basis for such jurisdiction.
Part II examines the due process limitations on a court's power to try a
foreign national seized abroad. Part III outlines the impact of a valid
extradition treaty on the United States government's power to try a de-
fendant seized in violation of that treaty. Part IV concludes, contrary to
the weight of authority, that even though the due process clause imposes
only minimal constraints on a court's power to try a foreign national
abducted abroad, an extradition treaty deprives United States courts of
jurisdiction to try a criminal defendant seized in violation of the treaty.
I. THE HISTORICAL BASIS: KER V. ILLINOIS
In Ker v. Illinois, decided in 1886, the United States Supreme Court
laid the groundwork for the current debate. 2 Wanted in Illinois on
charges of larceny and embezzlement, Frederick M. Ker, a United States
citizen, fled to Peru. 3 Pursuant to an extradition treaty between the
United States and Peru, the governor of Illinois sent an agent to Peru to
request Ker's extradition to the United States to face trial for larceny. 14
10. According to Professor Shearer, an "abduction" is "the removal of a person from the juris-
diction of one State to another by force, the threat of force or by fraud." I. SHEARER, supra note 9,
at 72. Typically, the foreign authorities or private individuals that abduct the suspected criminal do
not follow any formal proceedings. Id.
11. It is a settled principle of international law that when the person sought is found in a third
country, the requesting state may extradite the foreign national from the third country without the
consent of the fugitive's own government. Id. at 130 (citations omitted). Any differences in the
applicability of Part III to such a situation as opposed to the situation in which the accused is found
within his own country is beyond the scope of this Note.
12. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
13. Id. at 437-38.
14. Id. at 438. The governor requested the warrant for extradition from the Secretary of State
of the United States. Id. The President complied with this request and issued the warrant pursuant
to the treaty between the United States and Peru. Id. The Illinois Court ultimately tried and
convicted Ker of larceny. Id. at 437.
Under the principle of "specialty," a state requesting extradition may not, without permission of
the asylum state, try or punish the fugitive for any crimes committed before the extradition other
than the crimes specified in the extradition warrant. See supra note 3. Thus, if Peru had extradited
Ker to Illinois on a larceny charge and Illinois had tried and convicted Ker of embezzlement as well
as larceny, Ker could have challenged the embezzlement prosecution for lack of personal jurisdic-
tion. See Ker, 119 U.S. at 443; infra notes 61-67 and accompanying text. But cf United States v.
Kaufman, 858 F.2d 994, 1006-09 (5th Cir. 1988) (defendants, extradited from Mexico to Louisiana
to face drug charges, were transferred to Texas, where trial on similar charges was held not to offend
[Vol. 68:1047
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Political chaos in Peru, however, compelled the agent to forego the for-
mal extradition process.15 Instead, he forcibly arrested Ker and brought
him back to the United States.16 Upon Ker's return, an Illinois court
convicted him of larceny.17 Illinois' highest court affirmed the conviction
and Ker appealed to the United States Supreme Court.1 8
Ker argued to the Supreme Court that his arrest and conviction in
disregard of the extradition treaty violated the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.1 9 The Court rejected his argument, reasoning
that the Constitution does not require government authorization for
every arrest.2" The Court held that "mere irregularities" in taking a de-
fendant into custody do not violate the due process clause as long as the
defendant is indicted properly and receives a fair trial.21
principle of specialty); Fiocooni v. Attorney General 462 F.2d 475 (2d Cir.) (defendants, extradited
from Italy to face drug charges in Massachusetts, indicted in New York on similar charges), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1059 (1972).
15. At the time, Chilean forces occupied Lima, Peru's capitol, making it impossible for the
agent to execute the extradition request. See Fairman, Ker v. Illinois Revisited, 47 AM. J. INT'L L.
678, 685 (1953).
16. The agent requested and received assistance from the military governor appointed by Chile.
Id.
17. Ker, 119 U.S. at 437.
18. Id. at 439.
19. Id. at 439-40.
20. Id. at 440.
21. Id. The Court stated that "for mere irregularities in the manner in which he may be
brought into the custody of the law, we do not think he is entitled to say that he should not be tried
at all." Id.
The Court gave an example of such an irregularity 66 years later in Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S.
519 (1952). In that case, Collins, indicted in Michigan for murder, fled to Chicago, Illinois. Michi-
gan police officers went to Chicago and "forcibly seized, handcuffed, blackjacked and took him to
Michigan," where he was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. Id. at 520. The
defendant brought a federal habeas corpus suit claiming the conviction should be a nullity because
under the circumstances his trial violated the due process clause and the Federal Kidnapping Act.
Id. at 519-20. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, stating that it had never departed from
the rule announced in Ker and its "sound basis that due process of law is satisfied when one present
in court is convicted of crime after having been fairly apprized (sic] of the charges against him and
after a fair trial in accordance with constitutional procedural safeguards." Id. at 522.
Arguably, the Court departed from this rule just weeks earlier in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165, 166, 174 (1952), when it reversed the conviction of a defendant because the police forcibly
induced him to vomit morphine tablets, which the police then used as evidence at the defendant's
trial for possession of morphine. In holding that the state violated the defendant's due process
rights, Justice Frankfurter noted that "the proceedings by which this conviction was obtained do
more than offend some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism about combatting crime
too energetically. This is conduct that shocks the conscience." Id. at 172. See Pitler, "The Fruit of
the Poisonous Tree" Revisited and Shepardized, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 579, 599-601 (1968) (arguing that
the view concerning forcible removal and personal jurisdiction is inconsistent with the rules regard-
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Ker also argued that an extradition treaty between the United States
and Peru protected him from removal in violation of the terms of the
treaty.22 The Court rejected this argument, holding that an extradition
treaty merely limits the extent to which a government voluntarily may
grant a fugitive asylum. The Court explained that parties to such a
treaty agree that upon proper demand and proceedings the government
of the asylum must deliver the fugitive to the requesting country.23 The
Court reasoned that, because the agent did not act nor profess to act
under the treaty,2 4 Ker did not establish the denial of a right conferred
ing illegal searches and the policy of discouraging official lawlessness); The Supreme Court, 1951
Term, 66 HARv. L. REv. 89, 126-27 (1952) ("[lit is arguable that there should be no constitutional
difference between a trial using reliable evidence brutally obtained and a proceeding against a de-
fendant brutally obtained.") (citations omitted).
22. Ker, 119 U.S. at 441. The Court did not address the third argument made by Ker that the
forcible abduction of an alleged criminal from another country violates customary international law
and thus precludes trial in a state court following such a seizure. Justice Miller held that the issue
did not present a federal question and thus the Court did not have appellate jurisdiction to review
the Illinois court's decision. Id. at 444. The Court noted in dictum that "[there are authorities of
the highest respectability which hold that forcible abduction is no sufficient reason why the party
should not answer when brought within the jurisdiction of the court which has the right to try him
for such an offence, and presents no valid objection to his trial in such court." Id.
This dictum has become the leading precedent for the principle that a government's violation of
customary international law in bringing a defendant to trial presents no bar to his or her prosecution
in federal court. See Rogers, Prosecuting Terrorists When Does Apprehension in Violation of Inter-
national Law Preclude Trial?, 42 U. MIAMI L. REv. 446, 452 (1987) (collecting cases). But cf
United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68, 72-73 n.4 (2d Cir.) (Oakes, J., concurring) (finding untenable
Justice Miller's "distinction between treaty obligations and unwritten obligations of customary inter-
national law"), cert, denied, 423 U.S. 847 (1975).
Any possibility that a violation of customary international law could serve as the basis for denying
a court jurisdiction to hear a case seems foreclosed by the Court's decision in United States v. Crews,
445 U.S. 463 (1980). In Crews, a majority of the Court rejected the defendant's request to overturn
his conviction because his in-court identification was the product of an illegal arrest. Id. at 474.
Justice Brennan, citing Ker, reiterated that "[ain illegal arrest, without more, has never been viewed
as a bar to subsequent prosecution," and held that the defendant himself was not a suppressible
"fruit" such that the illegality of his arrest could deprive the Government of the opportunity to
prove his guilt. Id. at 474. Justice Brennan noted that:
[o]ur numerous precedents ordering the exclusion of such illegally obtained evidence as-
sume implicitly that the remedy does not extend to barring the prosecution altogether. So
drastic a step might advance marginally some of the ends served by exclusionary rules, but
it would also increase to an intolerable degree interference with the public interest in hav-
ing the guilty brought to book.
Id. at 474 n.20, (citing United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255 (1966)).
23. Ker, 119 U.S. at 442. Justice Miller ruled that no language creating such a "right of asy-
lum" existed in the treaty and that "the absurdity of such a proposition would at once prevent the
making of a treaty of that kind." Id.
24. Justice Miller characterized the agent's action as "a clear case of kidnapping within the
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upon him by the treaty.2"
Today, Ker is generally cited for the proposition that the means by
which a person is brought physically within a State's control is irrelevant
to the State's power to try him.26 Despite criticism,27 the Supreme Court
has continually reaffirmed Ker.28 Because Ker involved a United States
citizen abducted without official authorization, the case leaves open juris-
dictional questions arising when the United States government kidnaps a
foreigner from his home country.
II. THE DUE PROCESS CHALLENGE: UNITED STATES V TOSCANINO
In United States v. Toscanino,2 9 the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that due process protects foreign nationals kidnapped
abroad and brought to the United States to face trial.30 The defendant,
an Italian citizen, alleged that agents of the United States government
seized him from his home in Uruguay and interrogated and tortured him
for three weeks before transporting him to the United States.31 He al-
dominions of Peru, without any pretence of authority under the treaty or from the government of the
United States." Id. at 443.
25. Id. The Court noted, however, that Ker was not totally without a remedy. Justice Miller
stated that Peru could seek extradition of the agent who abducted Ker on charges of kidnapping.
Moreover, he noted that Ker could have an action against the agent for trespass and false imprison-
ment. Id. at 444. See Kear v. Hilton, 699 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1983) (bail bondsman who forcibly
abducted criminal defendant in Canada and returned the defendant to Florida for trial later extra-
dited to Canada to face kidnapping charges); McBride v. Soos, 594 F.2d 610, 612 n.3 (7th Cir. 1979)
(recognizing split of authority on issue whether failure to comply with interstate extradition proce-
dures is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and holding that such a cause of action does exist because
it involves violation of federal rights created by federal extradition statute). But cf Waits v. Mc-
Gowan, 516 F.2d 203, 208 (3d Cir. 1975) (leaving open question but doubting existence of such a
cause of action because Ker seems to hold that the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United
States do not afford defendant any protection in such a transaction).
26. Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 260 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Winter,
509 F.2d 975, 985-86 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub noma. Parks v. United States, 423 U.S. 825 (1975).
27. See Dickinson, Jurisdiction Following Seizure or Arrest in Violation of International Law, 28
AM. J. INT'L L. 231 (1934); Kester, supra note 7; Lewis, UnlawfulArrest: A Bar to the Jurisdiction
of the Court, or Mala Captus Bere Detentus? Sidney Jaffe: A Case in Point, 28 CRIM. L.Q. 341
(1986); Pitler, supra note 21; The Supreme Court, 1951 Term, supra note 21.
28. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1039.40 (1984) (alien summoned to deposition
hearing following allegedly unlawful arrest); United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980); Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485 (1976) (dicta); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975) (refusing to
"retreat from the established rule that illegal arrest or detention does not void a subsequent convic-
tion"); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
29. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
30. Id. at 275, 281.
31. Id. at 269-71.
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leged that the agents beat him, kept him awake for prolonged periods,
injected fluids into his eyes and nose, and administered electric shocks to
his ears, toes, and genitals.32  The Second Circuit held that when the
government obtains custody of a criminal defendant by a "deliberate, un-
necessary and unreasonable" violation of the accused's constitutional
rights, due process requires the court to divest itself of jurisdiction.3
32. Id. at 270.
33. Id. at 275. A threshold inquiry is whether assertion of the fifth amendment is a valid de-
fense for foreign nationals arrested abroad. In Toscanino, the court assumed without discussion that
fifth amendment protections extend to non-resident aliens seized abroad. Yet, in the same opinion,
the Second Circuit felt constrained to discuss separately whether such a defendant could invoke
fourth amendment protections to exclude certain evidence seized as the result of a wiretap on his
foreign residence. Id. at 280.
The Supreme Court recently addressed the applicability of the Bill of Rights to non-resident aliens
subject to criminal investigations abroad. In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056,
1059, reh'g denied, 110 S. CL 1839 (1990), the Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment did
not require the exclusion of evidence seized during a warrantless search of a foreign national's Mexi-
can home after he had been arrested and was awaiting trial in the United States. A plurality of the
Court held that the fourth amendment does not apply to searches and seizures by United States
agents of property owned by non-resident aliens when such searches and seizures occur in a foreign
country. Id. at 1066 (opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.). Four Justices, however, would extend fourth
amendment protections to non-resident aliens on the facts of this case. See id. at 1068 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (arguing that fourth amendment protections should extend to the defendant because he
was held for trial within the territorial United States); id. at 1077-78 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(same, but would remand for determination of whether agents had probable cause to search the
residence); id. at 1068-77 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that by placing a foreign national among
those governed by federal criminal laws and investigating him for violations of those laws the gov-
ernment has made him a part of our community for purposes of the fourth amendment).
The swing vote on the issue of the extraterritorial application of the fourth amendment belonged
to Justice Kennedy. Though joining the plurality's conclusion, he refused to go as far as Chief
Justice Rehnquist, holding only that the fourth amendment was not violated on the facts of the case.
Id. at 1068. Justice Kennedy rejected outright Chief Justice Rehnquist's reliance on the text of the
Constitution, finding no merit to the argument that the Framers' use of "the people" in the first,
second, fourth, ninth, and tenth amendments was intended to limit their scope to a certain group of
people while the fifth and sixth amendments, in which the term "persons" is used, were intended to
broadly regulate governmental power in criminal cases. Id. at 1060-61, 1067. More important,
however, is Justice Kennedy's narrower interpretation of key precedent relied upon by the plurality.
Justice Kennedy read the Court's decisions in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936), Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922), Dorr
v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904), Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903) and Downes v.
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901) for the proposition that certain constitutional provisions do not neces-
sadly apply under all circumstances in every foreign place, but may be restricted when adherence to
a specific guarantee is "impracticable and anomalous." Id. at 1067-68. He concluded, largely be-
cause of the absence of local judges or magistrates to issue warrants, that "the Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement should not apply in Mexico as it does in this country." Id. at 1068.
The implication of Justice Kennedy's opinion is that he is willing to extend fourth amendment
protections to nonresident aliens when it is not impracticable and anomalous to do so. In this in-
stance, Verdugo-Urquidez' Mexican home was searched only after agents of the Drug Enforcement
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Subsequent cases severely limit Toscanino's protection of a foreign na-
tional seized by the government to face criminal charges in the United
States. Three circuits expressly reject Toscanino, reasoning that the fifth
amendment places no restrictions on the government's power to seize
suspected criminals abroad.34 Those courts recognizing the Toscanino
exception to the Ker doctrine require the fulfillment of two conditions
before they will divest themselves of jurisdiction over a defendant ob-
tained in such a manner. First, the circumstances surrounding the de-
Agency (DEA) obtained an arrest warrant, arrested him and, while holding him in the United States
for trial, received authorization to conduct the search from high-ranking Mexican officials. Id. at
1059. It is possible, however, that Justice Kennedy would apply the fourth amendment to exclude
evidence on other facts. For example, if American authorities, without any prior presentation of
evidence to a neutral magistrate and without consulting the foreign authorities, broke into a non-
resident alien's home in the middle of the night, arrested him, and searched his home for evidence
linking him to alleged criminal activity, Justice Kennedy might hold that the fourth amendment
does not apply at all and might admit the evidence at the defendant's trial. It is equally likely,
however, that under these circumstances the search violates even the relaxed requirements of the
fourth amendment's reasonableness test as applied to nonresident aliens and Justice Kennedy might
vote to exclude the evidence.
With regard to the subject matter of this Note, Verdugo-Urquidez indicates that the dictates of the
fifth amendment always apply to protect a foreign national investigated, arrested, and subjected to
criminal trial in the courts of the United States. Chief Justice Rehnquist implicitly recognized this
rule when discussing the language of the fourth and fifth amendments. Id. at 1060-61. Justice Ken-
nedy recognized it explicitly, stating that "[a]ll ... agree" that the defendant was protected by the
due process clause. Id. at 1068. But cf infra note 34 and accompanying text.
34. To date, the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have expressly rejected Toscanino.
Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 263 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Darby, 744 F.2d
1508, 1531 (11th Cir. 1984), cer. denied, 471 U.S. 1100 (1985); United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d
975, 986-88 (5th Cir.), cerL denied sub nom. Parks v. United States, 423 U.S. 825 (1975).
In Matta-Ballesteros, the Seventh Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Graham v.
Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1871 (1989), to conclude that in § 1983 actions for use of excessive force
during arrest, a fourth amendment rather than a fifth amendment analysis applies. Matta-Balles-
terns, 896 F.2d at 261-62. Because the Seventh Circuit found that the values served by fourth
amendment exclusionary principles, deterrence of police lawlessness and maintenance of the integ-
rity of the judicial system, were outweighed by the governmental interest in convicting criminals, the
court declined to adopt Toscanino as the law of the circuit. Id. at 261-63.
The Seventh Circuit's rationale is tenuous at best. While such a "balancing" of policies may be
appropriate in § 1983 actions, the court di not contend that Graham overruled United States v.
Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973). Concurring in the Matta-Ballesteros decision, Judge Will quoted from
the Russell opinion, which states that there may be cases" 'in which the conduct of law enforcement
agents is so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the government from invok-
ing judicial process to obtain a conviction."' Matta-Ballesteros, 896 F.2d at 264 (Will, J., concur-
ring) (citing Russell, 411 U.S. at 431-32 (Rehnquist, J.)). The Supreme Court's recent decision in
Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990), makes it clear that the applicability of the fifth amend-
ment does not depend on policy considerations; its protections always apply to protect criminal
defendants from official overreaching.
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fendant's abduction must shock the conscience of the court.35 Second,
agents of the United States government must participate in the shocking
conduct.36
Just months after its decision in Toscanino, the Second Circuit severely
limited the scope of its holding, stating that absent conduct similar to
that which occurred in Toscanino,37 mere irregularities in the circum-
stances of a defendant's arrival in the jurisdiction will not vitiate the pro-
ceedings of a criminal court.38  Following the Second Circuit's lead,
other courts require facts similar to those in Toscanino before granting
relief.39
If the accused succeeds in proving shocking conduct, he must also
show that representatives of the United States government participated,
or at least acquiesced, in the conduct.' Indirect participation by United
States officials in torture administered by foreign authorities will not suf-
fice." Nor will initiating efforts that culminate in the arrest and torture
35. Matta-Ballesteros ex rel Stolar v. Henman, 697 F. Supp. 1040, 1046 (S.D. Il1. 1988), aff'd
sub nom. Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1990).
36. Id.
37. For a summary of the torture inflicted in Toscanino, see supra notes 31-32 and accompany-
ing text.
38. United States ex reL Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 65-66 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
1001 (1975). In Gengler, the defendant alleged that the DEA paid a pilot to lure him to Bolivia,
where he was arrested by Bolivian police acting "as paid agents of the United States." Id. at 63. The
agents then flew him to New York where federal officers sought his prosecution on drug trafficking
charges. Id. at 63. The court noted that the arrest was illegal because the United States did not
request extradition, but concluded that not every instance of official illegality is such that the fifth
amendment requires nullification of the indictment. Id. at 66.
39. The following cases found conduct insufficient to justify relief under the Toscanino excep-
tion: United States v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32, 37 (1st Cir. 1981) (Panamanian officers cooperating
with American agent insulted, pushed, and slapped one defendant, and held both defendants in a jail
where they were forced "to sleep on the floor and... 'huddle up in a corer' to avoid the splashing
of urine coming from prisoners in other cells"); United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 700 F. Supp. 528,
529 (N.D. Fla. 1988) (defendant "seized... at his home [and] forcibly subdued, possibly by means
of a stun gun"); United States v. Orman, 417 F. Supp. 1126, 1131 (D. Colo. 1976) (illegally tapping
telephone in Turkey).
40. United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68, 69 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847 (1975). In Lira,
Chilean police officers allegedly arrested and took the defendant to a police station in Santiago.
There, he was beaten, blindfolded, strapped nude to a box spring and tortured with electric shocks.
Id. at 69. The court found that evidence that the defendant heard English spoken during this tor-
ture, that he later saw American special agents at the prosecutor's office, that he was told that his
picture was "for the Americans," and that he had been arrested at the request of the DEA did not
establish sufficient involvement by United States officials to allow relief under Toscanino. Id. at 70-
71.
41. See United States v. DeGollado, 696 F. Supp. 1136, 1140 (S.D. Tex. 1988); Lira, 515 F.2d
at 71; supra note 40.
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of a defendant by foreign police, as long as United States government
agents are not present during the actual infliction of the torture.4 2
Because courts interpret Toscanino so narrowly,4 3 the decision imposes
only minimal restraints on the power of United States courts to try de-
fendants abducted abroad. To date, no court applying the Toscanino
analysis has dismissed an indictment.'
III. EXTRADITION TREATIES AS A LIMITATION OF KER v. ILLINOIS
Although due process requirements rarely limit a United States court's
power to try foreign nationals kidnapped by the United States govern-
ment, such defendants may have another avenue of relief. Under some
circumstances, an extradition treaty between the United States and a for-
eign nation will require a court to discharge a defendant seized in viola-
tion of the treaty.
In Ker v. Illinois,45 the Supreme Court rejected the defendant's claim
that the extradition treaty between the United States and Peru precluded
his prosecution.46 The Court emphasized that the agent who kidnapped
Ker acted in a purely private capacity and not as a United States govern-
ment agent.47 When the abduction is accomplished by an agent of the
United States government, however, the analysis is quite different.
A. Government-Authorized Treaty Violations
Cook v. United States4" involved a treaty between the United States
and Great Britain prohibiting the United States Coast Guard from
boarding British ships beyond a fixed distance from the American
42. United States v. Fielding, 645 F.2d 719, 723-24 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Lara, 539
F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1976).
In DeGollado, American officials cooperated in the defendant's arrest in Mexico and watched
while his interrogators sprayed seltzer water up his nose. The court held that because the American
agents left when they saw the interrogation begin to turn "rough" and were not present when the
interrogators subsequently tortured the defendant with an electrical prod, no due process violation
occurred. DeGollado, 696 F. Supp. at 1139-40.
43. See supra notes 37-42.
44. Matta-Ballesteros v. Hemnan, 896 F.2d 255, 261 (7th Cir. 1990). Indeed, on remand after
the Toscanino decision, the district court denied the motion to dismiss, ruling that there was no
claim of participation by American agents in the defendant's abduction and torture. See United
States v. Toscanino, 398 F. Supp. 916, 917 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
45. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
46. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
47. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
48. 288 U.S. 102 (1933).
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coast.49 The Coast Guard seized a British ship outside the prescribed
distance and returned the crew to the United States to face liquor smug-
gling charges.5" The Supreme Court affirmed the federal district court's
decision to dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. 51
The Court rejected the government's attempt to invoke Ker,5 2 distin-
guishing a seizure unauthorized by the United States government from a
seizure by the government.53 The Court explained that the treaty fixed
the conditions under which the United States could seize a vessel and
subject its crew to an adjudication under American law.54 The Court
concluded that allowing a criminal prosecution following a seizure by the
government in contravention of its promise not to undertake such a
seizure would render the treaty meaningless.55
49. The treaty allowed the United States Coast Guard to board private British vessels outside
the territorial boundaries of the United States to enforce the prohibition laws provided such board-
ings did not take place at a distance from the American coast greater than the distance the ship
could travel in one hour. Cook, 288 U.S. at 112.
50. Cook, 288 U.S. at 107-08, 110.
51. Id. at 108-09, 122. The Court paved the way for Cook six years earlier with its decision in
Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593 (1927). Ford, the captain of a British ship seized by the Coast
Guard outside the maximum distance allowed by the treaty for such seizures, was tried and con-
victed in federal district court for violating the prohibition laws. Ford, 273 U.S. at 600. On appeal,
Ford argued that the treaty violation deprived the court ofjurisdiction. In response, the government
relied on Ker for the proposition that an illegal seizure would not impair the court's power to try
Ford. Id. at 605. The Court rejected this argument and noted that Ker does not apply when "a
treaty of the United States is directly involved." Id. However, the Court affirmed the conviction
because the defendant did not challenge jurisdiction in a timely manner. Id. at 605-06, 625.
In two subsequent cases involving violations of a similar treaty between the United States and
Panama, the defendants' timely challenges to jurisdiction succeeded. United States v. Schouweiler,
19 F.2d 387 (S.D. Cal. 1927); United States v. Ferris, 19 F.2d 925 (N.D. Cal. 1927).
52. The Court relied primarily on Dodge v. United States, 272 U.S. 530, 532 (1926), for the
proposition that when "the United States, having possession of property, files a libel to enforce a
forfeiture resulting from a violation of its laws, the fact that the possession was acquired by a wrong-
ful act is immaterial." Cook, 288 U.S. at 121 (citing Dodge, 272 U.S. at 532).
53. The court stated:
The objection to the seizure is not that it was wrongful merely because made by one upon
whom the Government had not conferred authority to seize at the place where the seizure
was made. The objection is that the Government itself lacked power to seize, since by the
Treaty it had imposed a territorial limitation upon its own authority.
Cook, 288 U.S. at 121.
54. Id. See also Ford, 273 U.S. at 606 (when a treaty of the United States is directly involved,
the question is "quite different" from that raised in Ker).
55. Cook, 288 U.S. at 121-22 ("To hold that adjudication may follow a wrongful seizure would
go far to nullify the purpose and effect of the Treaty.").
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B. Abduction as a Violation of an Extradition Treaty
The caveat to Ker established in Cook raises a second issue: whether
seizure by the United States government of a foreign national from a
country with whom the United States has a treaty of extradition violates
that treaty. 6 Dictum in Ker suggests no such "right of asylum" exists5 7
and some courts of appeals are reluctant to so hold.58 Some commenta-
tors59 and at least one circuit court,' however, would find a violation of
an extradition treaty when the United States seizes a foreigner abroad
56. The United States has entered into bilateral treaties of extradition with over ninety coun-
tries. 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1988) (listing countries). This list includes virtually all of the major drug
producing, processing, and distributing countries. See Extradition Treaty, Jan. 25, 1980, United
States-Mexico, 31 U.S.T. 5059, T.I.A.S. No. 9656; Treaty of Extradition, Dec. 17, 1964, United
States-Brazil, 15 U.S.T. 2093, T.I.A.S. No. 5691; Extradition Treaty, Nov. 12, 1873, United States-
Ecuador, 18 Stat. 199, T.S. No. 79; Additional Extradition Treaty, June 18, 1926, United States-
Cuba, 44 Stat. 2392, T.S. No. 737; Treaty of Extradition, April 14, 1923, United States-Venezuela,
43 Stat. 1698, T.S. No. 675; Treaty of Extradition, July 10, 1911, United States-El Salvador, 37 Stat.
1516, T.S. No. 560; Treaty for the Extradition of Criminals, July 14, 1907, United States-Nicaragua,
35 Stat. 1869, T.S. No. 462; Treaty Providing for the Mutual Extradition of Fugitives from Justice,
March 2, 1905, United States-Cuba, 33 Stat. 2265, T.S. No. 440; Treaty Providing for the Extradi-
tion of Criminals, Feb. 22, 1901, United States-Peru, 31 Stat. 1921, T.S. No. 288; Extradition Treaty,
Nov. 12, 1873, United States-Ecuador, 18 Stat. 199, T.S. No. 79.
On September 14, 1979, the United States government signed an extradition treaty with Colombia,
which replaced the treaties of 1888 and 1940. I EXTRADrION LAWS AND TREATIES, at 140.1 n.1
(I. KAvAsS & A. SPRuDzs CoMp. 1989). However, in December, 1986 and June, 1987, the Supreme
Court of Colombia declared the 1979 treaty unconstitutional. The State Department continues to
recognize the 1979 treaty, even though Colombian authorities indicate that they consider the 1888
and 1940 conventions the effective treaties. Id. In response to these decisions, President Barco of
Colombia issued an emergency order allowing the summary extradition of any Colombian indicted
by the United States. Fricker, supra note 5, at 58. DEA agents or Colombian police can "extradite"
these individuals without prior notice. Id. Such proceedings are not performed under the auspices
of any extradition treaty between the United States and Columbia. I EXTRADITION LAWS AND
TREATiES, supra, at 140.1, n.l.
The United States is also a party to the Pan American Extradition Convention signed at Monte-
video on December 26, 1933 and entered into force for the United States on January 25, 1935. Pan
American Extradition Convention, Jan. 25, 1935, 49 Stat. 3111. Other signatories to the treaty
include Argentina, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Panama.
57. See supra notes 22-25.
58. United States v. Valot, 625 F.2d 308, 310 (9th Cir. 1980) (no treaty violation when Thai
authorities "initiated, aided, and acquiesced" in defendant's delivery to DEA agents); United States
v. Sobell, 244 F.2d 520, 525 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 873 (1957) (no treaty violation despite
allegations that U.S. agents initiated, planned, and participated in seizure of defendant in Mexico).
59. See Rogers, supra note 22, at 460 (Supreme Court has held that entry into an extradition
treaty infers an intention to relinquish the right recognized in Ker); Lewis, supra note 27, at 359-63
(allowing abductions in violation of an extradition treaty erodes the importance of treaties as "the
Supreme law of the land").
60. Jaffe v. Smith, 825 F.2d 304, 307 (11th Cir. 1987) (the law is not concerned with the man-
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without the consent of the government involved and without resort to
traditional extradition procedures.
Supreme Court precedent supports the conclusion that an abduction
without the consent of the foreign government violates an extradition
treaty. In United States v. Rauscher,61 the United States extradited Rau-
scher from Great Britain for the murder of one of the crew of an Ameri-
can ship.62 A federal district court convicted Rauscher of assault and the
infliction of cruel and unusual punishment.63 On appeal to the Supreme
Court, Rauscher argued that his extradition for the murder charge pre-
cluded the district court from trying him on any other charge."4 The
Court agreed, reasoning that it would be useless for nations to establish
detailed procedural safeguards65 as prerequisites to the international ren-
dition of a criminal defendant if the country seeking to prosecute may
ignore these procedures and yet retain power to try the case.66
ner in which a criminal defendant finds her or his way into court unless the government removed the
defendant from the asylum in violation of a treaty).
On August 10, 1990, a federal judge in California ruled that the United States government vio-
lated its extradition treaty with Mexico when it kidnapped a Mexican doctor for trial. United States
v. Caro-Quintero, No. CR 87-422-ER (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist file).
The judge ordered Dr. Humberto Alvarez Machain discharged and directed the government to repa-
triate him to Mexico. Id. Machain was accused of participating in the torture and murder of DEA
agent Enrique Camerena at a ranch outside Guadalajara in 1985. DEA operatives captured the
doctor at his office and took him out of Mexico on April 2, 1990.
The court rejected the government's argument that no treaty violation occurred because no DEA
agents were directly involved in Alvarez's kidnapping. Id. The judge cited testimony indicating that
the DEA paid at least $20,000 in rewards for Alvarez's abduction and provided the abductors and
their families $6,000 to defray living expenses. In addition, high level DEA officials approved the
plan and the United States Attorney General's office was aware of the plan. The judge stated that
"[t]he United States is responsible for the actions of its paid agents." Id.
61. 119 U.S. 407 (1886). Rauscher was decided the same day as Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436
(1886). Justice Miller wrote the majority opinion in both.
62. Id. at 409.
63. Id.
64. Id. See supra note 3.
65. Under the terms of the treaty, an obligation to deliver up a fugitive arose only after he was
formally charged with one of the crimes enumerated in the treaty and a judge or magistrate of the
asylum country determined that sufficient evidence existed under the law of the asylum to justify the
accused's apprehension and commitment for trial. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 421.
66. Justice Miller stated:
[i]f the proceedings under which the party is arrested . .. are to have no influence in
limiting the prosecution in the country where the offence is charged to have been commit-
ted, there is very little use for this particularity in charging a specific offence, requiring that
offence to be one mentioned in the treaty, as well as sufficient evidence of the party's guilt
to put him upon trial for it.
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The Rauscher Court's rationale applies to situations in which the gov-
ernment abducts a person from another country without resort to the
extradition process. In Rauscher, the Court found that the United States
violated the treaty by trying the defendant for cruel and unusual punish-
ment even though a British tribunal had already found sufficient evidence
to try him for the more serious crime of murder.67 In the case of an
international abduction in which no prior judicial determination of the
sufficiency of the evidence is made, nor any other procedural protection
afforded the defendant, a court certainly would find an even more egre-
gious violation of the treaty.6"
C. Self-Executing Treaties
Assuming that the United States government's seizure of an alleged
criminal abroad violates an extradition treaty, the majority of courts re-
quire an official protest from the nation involved to defeat the court's
jurisdiction. 69 These courts reason that because treaties protect the sov-
ereignty of states, only the contracting foreign government, not the de-
fendant, may complain about a violation.7 °
67. Id. at 409.
68. See United States v. Ferris, 19 F.2d 925, 926 (N.D. Cal. 1927) (citing Rauscher and stating
that "[i]t seems clear that, if one legally before the court cannot be tried because therein a treaty is
violated, for greater reason one illegally before the court, in violation of a treaty, likewise cannot be
subjected to trial").
69. Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 259-60 (7th Cir. 1990) (involving extradition
treaty with Honduras); United States v. Zabaneh, 837 F.2d 1249, 1261 (5th Cir. 1988) (involving
extradition treaties with Guatemala and Belize); United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025, 1030 (2d
Cir. 1985) (involving treaty with Switzerland to aid in gathering Swiss bank records); United States
v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32, 37-38 (1st Cir. 1981) (involving extradition treaties with Panama and Vene-
zuela); United States v. Valot, 625 F.2d 308, 310 (9th Cir. 1980) (involving extradition treaties with
Thailand); United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 909, 916 (D.D.C. 1988) (involving extradition trea-
ties with Lebanon and Cyprus).
On August 10, 1990, a federal judge in California ordered the discharge of a Mexican doctor
kidnapped by DEA operatives and taken to the United States to face trial for the killing of an
American drug agent. United States v. Caro-Quintero, No. CR 87-422-ER (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10,
1990) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist file). The court ruled that the United States government vio-
lated its extradition treaty with Mexico in carrying out the abduction. Id. See supra note 60. In
ordering the discharge, the court noted that Mexico sent three diplomatic letters to the United States
protesting the kidnapping as a violation of its sovereignty. Id. The judge held that when a treaty is
violated and the asylum nation protests, the court must return the defendant. Id.
70. See supra note 69. See a/so United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 67 (2d Cir.)
(citations omitted), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975). The Second Circuit asserted that "even
where a treaty provides certain benefits for nationals of a particular state.., it is traditionally held
that 'any rights arising out of such provisions are, under international law, those of the states and...
individual rights are only derivative through the states."' Gengler, 510 F.2d at 67 (quoting RE-
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Cook v. United States, however, does not conform to this logic. 71 In
Cook, the Supreme Court did not ask whether Great Britain filed an offi-
cial protest and yet it affirmed dismissal of the case for lack of personal
jurisdiction. Thus, it seems clear that an official protest is not always a
prerequisite to a jurisdictional plea based on a treaty violation. When it
is, the appropriate remedy may be reparations, apologies, or extradition
of the kidnappers themselves to the nation whose sovereignty is violated.
However, when an official protest is not required, the violation may de-
prive the court of jurisdiction.72
According to the United States Constitution, "all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme Law of the Land.' 73 The courts regard certain treaties as
self-executing, that is, as attaining the force of law upon execution by the
executive branch. Other treaties require ratification by Congress before
attaining the force of law.74 If a treaty is neither self-executing nor rati-
fied by Congress, only the executive branch may attempt to enforce it by
demanding redress of violations.75  Courts may enforce self-executing
treaties, on the other hand, in the same manner as any other act of
Congress.76
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115 comment
e (1965)).
71. 288 U.S. 102 (1933). See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text.
72. Rogers, supra note 22, at 454 (citations omitted). See also I. SHEARER, supra note 9, at 72.
Professor Shearer notes that only two unresolved questions remain in the area of forcible abductions
from the jurisdiction of one state to another. One is the effect of a privately-conducted abduction on
international responsibility and the other "whether the jurisdiction of the receiving State is vitiated
by the irregular means by which its jurisdiction has been obtained." Id.
73. U.S. CONST. Art. VI, cl. 2.
74. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253,
314 (1829). In Foster, Chief Justice Marshall explained:
Our Constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be
regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates
of itself without the aid of any legislative provision. But when the terms of the stipulation
import a contract, when either of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty
addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must exe-
cute the contract before it can become a rule for the Court.
Foster, 27 U.S. at 314.
75. In the Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884), the Court explained:
[a] treaty is primarily a compact between independent nations. It depends for the enforce-
ment of its provisions on the interest and the honor of the governments which are parties to
it. If these fail, its infraction becomes the subject of international negotiations and recla-
mations, so far as the injured party chooses to seek redress, which may in the end be
enforced by actual war.
76. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 598-99 (when a treaty is self-executing, a court may resort
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The issue whether a treaty is self-executing has been described as "one
of the most confounding in treaty law."77 In the Head Money Cases,78
Justice Miller explained that a treaty is more than a contract between
nations when its provisions affect the rights of a private citizen.79 When
such treaties are violated, both the injured nation and private parties may
assert the treaty as a rule of decision and seek redress for the violation."0
Therefore, a treaty is self-executing as a matter of domestic law if it cre-
ates, as a matter of international law, private rights cognizable in domes-
tic courts.,,
This approach explains Cook. The Court interpreted the 1924 treaty
with Great Britain, which delineated the conditions under which the
Coast Guard could board British vessels, as also affirmatively prohibiting
the prosecution of persons arrested in violation of the treaty.82 The Cook
Court applied the treaty as it would any other rule of law. Because this
"law" prohibited the prosecution of persons seized in violation of its pro-
visions, the Court dismissed the case.8 3
"to the treaty for a rule of decision for the case before it as it would to a statute"); Foster, 27 U.S. at
314.
77. United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 876 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979).
78. 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
79. Id. at 598-99. See also United States v. Ferris, 19 F.2d 925, 926 (N.D. Cal. 1927) (treaties,
"in so far as they are self-executing and relate to private rights are to be given effect by the courts to
the extent they are capable of judicial enforcement").
80. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
81. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("When no
right is explicitly stated, courts look to the treaty as a whole to determine whether it evidences an
intent to provide a private right of action."), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985); Diggs v. Richardson,
555 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("In determining whether a treaty is self-executing courts look to
the intent of the signatory parties as manifested by the language of the instrument, and ... the
circumstances surrounding its execution.").
The self-execution question has two aspects. Reisenfield, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties
and United States v. Postal: Win at Any Price?, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 892, 896-97 (1980). The interna-
tional aspect focuses on "whether the treaty aims at the immediate creation of rights and duties of
private individuals which are enforceable and to be enforced by domestic tribunals." Standard rules
of international treaty interpretation are used to analyze this aspect of the question. Id. at 896-97.
The domestic aspect asks whether and under what circumstances enforceability requires legislative
action to accomplish its intent. Id. at 897. Professor Reisenfleld concludes:
[a] treaty provision which by its terms and purpose is meant to stipulate the immediate...
creation of rights, privileges, duties, and immunities cognizable in domestic courts and is
capable of being applied by the courts without further concretization is self-executing by
virtue of the constitutional mandate of Article VI of the U.S. Constitution.
Id. at 900-01 (emphasis in original).
82. Cook, 288 U.S. at 119 (the treaty is self-executing).
83. In United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 277-79 (2d Cir. 1974), the Second Circuit held
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D. Extradition Treaties as Self-Executing
The only remaining issue is whether extradition treaties are self-exe-
cuting. In United States v. Rauscher,84 the Court did not consider
whether Great Britain protested the defendant's prosecution.85 Instead,
the Court interpreted the treaty affirmatively to prohibit the prosecu-
tion.86 The Court enforced the treaty just as it would enforce a statute
conferring the same right, and dismissed the case. Therefore, the Rau-
scher court must have viewed the extradition treaty with Peru as self-
that because the defendant's arrest was effected in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and
the Charter of the Organization of American States, the court lacked jurisdiction to prosecute him.
These treaties generally proscribe the use of force against the territorial integrity of another state.
See Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 277. Thus, they are more properly examples of the contractual variety of
treaty which depends for its enforcement on the will of the political branches of the party nations.
People of Saipan v. United States Dep't of Interior, 502 F.2d 90, 100 (9th Cir. 1974) (Trask, J.,
concurring) ("Charter of the United Nations is not self-executing and does not in and of itself create
rights which are justiciable between individual litigants"), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1003 (1975); Rog-
ers, supra note 22, at 461 (a jurisdictional "challenge based on a friendship treaty, a border treaty, or
a jurisdiction-allocating treaty ... should not be considered by a United States court"). The Second
Circuit seemed to recognize its error in United States ex rel Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975). There, the court distinguished Toscanino as a case in which
official government protests preceded the court's action. Id. at 67. Unfortunately, subsequent courts
have misinterpreted Gengler to require an official protest to justify a defendant's standing to assert a
treaty violation in all cases, instead of recognizing the crucial distinction between treaties that are
and are not self-executing.
84. 119 U.S. 407 (1886). See supra note 61-66 and accompanying text.
85. Only an official protest by the government of the asylum nation will sustain a defendant's
claim that his country is protesting a prosecution in violation of an extradition treaty. See Matta-
Ballesteros ex rel. Stolar v. Henman, 697 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D. Ill. 1988), aff'd sub nom. Matta-
Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1990). The Matta-Ballesteros court found no official
protest of the defendant's abduction despite an affidavit from members of the Honduran Congress
condemning the defendant's abduction and asserting that it provoked public demonstrations result-
ing in the death of five Honduran citizens, six million dollars in property damage, and a state of
national emergency. Id. at 1043-44.
In United States v. Caro-Quintero, No. CR 87-422-ER, at n.12 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 1990) (LEXIS,
Genfed Library, Dist file), Judge Rafeedie stated that in Rauscher, the British government protested
under the treaty, thereby vesting the defendant with standing to invoke his individual rights. This
statement is incorrect. WVhile the British did voice their strong opposition to prosecutions in viola-
tion of the treaty, no official protest was made. See United States v. Kaufman, 858 F.2d 994, 1009
(5th Cir. 1988) (the United States was aware of Britain's objections as a result of failed negotiations
not as a result of a formal British protest). In support of his statement, Judge Rafeedie quotes a
portion of a statement made by Chief Justice Taft in his opinion in Ford v. United States, 273 U.S.
593, 615 (1926). Quoted in full, Chief Justice Taft's statement that "[t]he case was decided at the
end of a prolonged controversy between Great Britain and the United States through their State
Departments on the same issue presented in several cases," reveals that no offical protest was made in
the Rauscher case. Id. (emphasis added).
86. See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
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executing.87
The structure of many extradition treaties provides further evidence
that they are self-executing. When the accused is a citizen of the request-
ing country, as in Ker, the asylum country is obligated to deliver up the
fugitive upon proper demand.8 8 However, many extradition treaties ex-
empt nationals of the asylum nation from prosecution abroad 9 because
of the potential unfairness involved in defending against criminal charges
in a foreign land.90 Because they protect individual rights, these treaties,
as applied to a national of the asylum nation, are self-executing. 91 There-
87. This conclusion is bolstered by the settled view that the executive branch lacks power to
seize a fugitive criminal and surrender him to a foreign nation. Valentine v. United States ex reL
Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 9 (1936) (the Constitution creates no executive right to seize an individual
without express authority from a statute or treaty); Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287
(1933) (extradition rights exist only by treaty).
In Argento v. Horn, 241 F.2d 258, 259 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 255 U.S. 818 (1957), the Italian
government initiated extradition proceedings against the appellant. After a United States Commis-
sioner found sufficient evidence to sustain the action and ordered appellant's arrest, appellant
brought a habeas corpus action challenging the legality of his confinement. Id. He argued that
because no valid extradition treaty existed between the United States and Italy, there was no legal
authority for his surrender to Italy. Id. Although it ultimately found that such a treaty was in force,
the court noted that "[w]ithout question the appellant is on solid ground in asserting that he cannot
be extradited... in the absence of a valid treaty so providing." Id. at 263, 259. Thus, the court
recognized that the existence of an extradition treaty determines whether a defendant may be
prosecuted.
88. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
89. The extradition treaties in force between the United States and Chile, Treaty Providing for
the Extradition of Fugitives from Justice, June 26, 1902, United States-Chile, art. V, 32 Stat. 1850,
T.S. No. 407; El Salvador, Treaty of Extradition, July 10, 1911, United States-El Salvador, art. VIII,
27 Stat. 1516, T.S. No. 560; Panama, Treaty Providing for the Extradition of Criminals, May 8,
1905, United States-Panama, art. V, 34 Stat. 2851, T.S. No. 445; Peru, Treaty Providing for the
Extradition of Criminals, Feb. 22, 1901, United States-Peru, art. V, 31 Stat. 1921, T.S. No. 288; and
Venezuela, Treaty of Extradition, April 14, 1923, United States-Venezuela, art. VIII, 43 Stat. 1698,
T.S. No. 675, still provide that neither country is bound to deliver up its own nationals under the
provisions of the treaty. The treaties with Brazil, Treaty of Extradition, Dec. 17, 1964, United
States-Brazil, art. VII, 15 U.S.T. 2093, T.I.A.S. No. 5791; Guatemala, Treaty for the Mutual Extra-
dition of Fugitives from Justice, Aug. 15, 1903, United States-Guatemala, art. V, 33 Stat. 2147, T.S.
No. 425; and Mexico, 21 Extradition Treaty, Jan. 25, 1980, United States-Mexico, art. 9, 31 U.S.T.
5059, T.I.A.S. No. 9656, provide for the extradition of nationals only at the discretion of the con-
tracting nations.
90. Professor Shearer advances three primary bases for the practice of refusing to surrender
nationals for trial and punishment in other countries: 1) a person deserves a trial before his natural
judges; 2) a State has a duty to protect its subjects; and 3) a foreign court may not be able to mete out
justice to a foreigner as it might to its own national or effectively apply to the foreigner the laws of
his home state. I. SHEARER, supra note 9, at 118-121. See also S. BEDI, EXTRADrIION IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 210 (1968); D. OTr, supra note 3, at 142 (extradition treaties provide
the accused with "procedural rights" to protect from victimization by a foreign state).
91. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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fore, when a foreign national invokes a violation of an extradition treaty
as a defense to a criminal prosecution, a United States court must enforce
the treaty and dismiss the case. 2
IV. A GUIDE TO RESOLVING THE JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES
A. The Due Process Argument
In Ker v. Illinois,9 the Court suggested that due process requirements
are satisfied if a criminal defendant seized abroad receives a fair trial. In
United States v. Toscanino,94 however, the Second Circuit recognized
that modern notions of due process afford such defendants a modicum of
additional protection. Although some courts purport to reject the Tos-
canino holding,95 it is clear that a court must divest itself of jurisdiction
when the means used by the government to bring the defendant to trial
"shock the conscience" of the court.96 Although courts often interpret
this standard very narrowly,97 recognition that a standard exists assures
defendants of receiving at least the minimum protection required by due
process.
B. The Treaty Argument
It is a mistake to assume that once the minimum protections imposed
by the fifth amendment are satisfied, no further obstacle exists to the
prosecution of a foreign national seized abroad. It is incumbent upon a
court to inquire whether an applicable extradition treaty bars the
prosecution.
Although the Supreme Court held in Ker that the extradition treaty
92. Although some criticize such provisions and question the vitality of the rationale behind
them, the fact remains that until new extradition treaties are negotiated, these provisions must serve
as the basis for determining whether an extradition treaty is self-executing. See I. SHEARER, supra
note 9, at 121-25 (criticizing the nationality rule).
In 1982, the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Crime held hearings regarding re-
form of the extradition laws. The Committee expressed concern that current extradition laws are
not sufficient to deal with increased terrorism and drug trafficking on the international level. Extra-
dition Reform Act of 1981: Hearings on H.R. 5227Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the Committee
on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1982) (statement of Hon. William J. Hughes, Chairman of
the Subcommittee).
93. 119 U.S. 436 (1886). See supra notes 12-21 and accompanying text.
94. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974). See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
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with Peru posed no obstacle to the defendant's prosecution,9" two crucial
facts distinguish that case from the issue at hand.99 First, the defendant
in Ker was a United States citizen, not a foreign national."° Second, the
United States government did not authorize Ker's abduction. 101
If the United States government violates an extradition treaty by seiz-
ing a foreigner without resort to the extradition process,102 most courts
require an official protest from the nation involved to defeat the court's
jurisdiction. 10 3 Such a protest, however, is not a prerequisite to a plea to
the court's jurisdiction if the treaty is self-executing," 4 that is, if by the
treaty the parties intend not only to contract with each other, but to
confer rights on private parties cognizable in domestic courts. 05
In United States v. Rauscher, °1 the Court reversed the conviction of a
defendant tried in violation of an extradition treaty with Great Britain,
though the English made no official protest. In so doing, the Court im-
98. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
99. In Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933), the Court established that when the defend-
ant is a foreign national and the United States government authorizes the abduction, a different
analysis is required. See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 24.
102. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text. See also United States v. Caro-Quintero, No.
CR 87-422(F)-ER (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist file). In Caro-Quintero,
because the Mexican government registered an official protest to the abduction of the defendant by
DEA operatives, the court discharged the defendant. Id. See supra note 69-70 and accompanying
text. In dictum, the court suggested that absent such diplomatic protests, the defendant would have
no basis for attacking the jurisdiction of the court. Id. The court reconciled those cases allowing an
individual defendant to invoke a violation of the doctrine of specialty, see supra note 3, by character-
izing such claims as an implicit protest by the asylum country. Id.
The reasoning of the Caro-Quintero court's dictum is flawed. An individual defendant's assertion
of a violation of the doctrine of specialty as a defense in criminal prosecution is not based on an
implicit protest by the sending nation. Instead, it is derived from a self-executing extradition treaty,
which creates private rights cognizable in domestic courts. See United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S.
407 (1886) (prosecution invalid when jurisdiction obtained in violation of doctrine of specialty);
supra notes 81, 85-86 and accompanying text. Thus, when an extradition treaty is self-executing, it is
irrelevant whether the sending nation fies an official protest.
The extradition treaty in force between the United States and Mexico provides for the extradition
of nationals only at the discretion of the contracting nations. Extradition Treaty, Jan. 25, 1980,
United States-Mexico, art. 8, 31 U.S.T. 5059, T.I.A.S. No. 9656. Therefore, according to the analy-
sis set out in Part III of this Note, a diplomatic protest by the Mexican government was not a
prerequisite to the Caro-Quintero defendant's jurisdictional plea. See supra notes 46-92 and accom-
panying text.
104. See supra notes 73-81 and accompanying text.
105. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
106. 119 U.S. 407 (1886). See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
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plied that the treaty not only proscribed certain actions by the party na-
tions, but protected individual rights, the touchstone of a self-executing
treaty. By specifically restricting the extent to which a country's own
nationals are subject to the extradition process, 10 7 many extradition trea-
ties to which the United States is a party manifest the same intent and are
thus similarly self-executing."' l
As a result, when the United States government abducts an alleged
criminal from a country with which it has entered into an extradition
treaty exempting nationals of the asylum nation from the extradition pro-
cess,1°9 a United States court lacks jurisdiction to try the defendant.' 1
107. Under this analysis it is irrelevant whether the treaty absolutely prohibits the extradition of
a party's nationals, or leaves it to the discretion of the party whether to grant requests for extradition
of its nationals. In either case the contracting nations agree to confer a specific right on a class of
individuals to protect them from the perceived unfairness involved in defending against criminal
charges in a foreign country. The Court's reasoning in Rauscher is directly applicable. See supra
note 55 and accompanying text. To allow the prosecution of foreign nationals seized in violation of
such provisions would render meaningless the protection the provisions are intended to provide.
108. See supra note 90.
109. Id.
110. In January 1990, the United States government arrested General Manual Antonio Noriega
in Panama and returned him to the Untied States to face trial on drug trafficking charges. See supra
note 7. Under the analysis advanced in Part III, the federal district court in Miami may lack juris-
diction to try Noriega.
First, the United States government clearly authorized Noriega's arrest. See supra note 7. Thus,
Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 435 (1886), is inapplicable. See supra notes 12-25 and accompanying text.
Instead, the principles established in Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933), govern the issue of
whether Noriega successfully may challenge the court's jurisdiction based on the United States gov-
ernment's violation of its treaties with Panama. See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text. Sec-
ond, the United States government undoubtedly violates an extradition treaty when it seizes an
alleged criminal abroad without recourse to treaty processes. See supra notes 55-67 and accompany-
ing text.
The United States may argue, however, that Panama's legitimate government, headed by Guil-
lermo Endara, consented to the seizure, and therefore, no treaty violation occurred. Such an argu-
ment invokes the third step in the analysis: deciding whether the extradition treaty between the
United States and Panama creates a private right against prosecution of nationals seized from the
asylum state without recourse to the treaty processes. See supra notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
Article V of the extradition treaty between the United States and Panama provides that "[n]either
of the contracting parties shall be bound to deliver up its own citizens or subjects under the stipula-
tions of this treaty." Treaty Providing for the Extradition of Criminals, May 8, 1905, United States-
Panama, art. V, 34 Stat. 2851, T.I.A.S. No. 445. Though the United States expressly rejected a
similar provision in the Multilateral Convention on Extradition, to which both the United States and
Panama are parties, that treaty states that it is not intended to abrogate treaties already in force
between the signatory parties. Extradition Convention between the United States of America and
other American Republics, Jan. 25, 1935, art. 2 & 21, 49 Stat. 3111. Provisions exempting nationals
of the asylum state from extradition derive from concerns about the fairness of facing criminal
charges in a foreign country. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. Given these concerns, it is
arguable that the extradition treaty between the United States and Panama is intended to proscribe
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V. CONCLUSION
When a foreign national is abducted from another country, it is incum-
bent upon a court to inquire whether violation of an applicable extradi-
tion treaty bars prosecution. Merely reciting the shibboleth that treaties
are contracts between nations, and that violations are only enforceable by
the contracting parties, is not adequate. Some treaties are intended to
create individual rights enforceable in domestic courts. Modem courts
ignore this issue altogether, and in the process ignore a century of estab-
lished treaty law.
No one questions the importance of punishing international drug traf-
fickers for the harm they inflict on the world community. In their zeal to
bring such people to justice, however, courts should not discard princi-
ples once considered fundamental to the legitimacy of governmental as-
sertions of power.
Appeals to the rule of law and established principles of criminal justice
administration continue to go unheard in the current hysteria to lock up
more and more "drug lords." ' Though the ends are laudable, the con-
sequences may be severe. It may take the kidnap and trial of an Ameri-
can citizen in a foreign nation to make the point." 2 The courts should
adhere to fundamental principles, for the protection of individual liberty
from arbitrary governmental power is the foundation of this nation's
existence.
Martin B. Sipple
the prosecution of foreign nationals seized in violation of the treaty. See supra notes 85-92 and
accompanying text. If the treaty is so construed, the federal court in Miami lacks jurisdiction to try
General Noriega and is obligated to return him to Panama.
11. See Wisotsky, supra note 1, at 925-26 (the "drug exception" to the Bill of Rights threatens
to spill over into other areas of the law).
112. For example, an Iranian law authorizes the arrest and trial of Americans without regard to
national boundaries. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
1069
Washington University Open Scholarship
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol68/iss4/9
